Provided in Cooperation with
Through the Funhouse Looking Glass:
Europe's Ship of States * La vingtième siècle ouvrira l'ére de fédérations ou l'humanité recommençera un purgatoire de mille ans.
The twentieth century will herald the age of federalism, or humanity will enter another thousand years of purgatory. Der tiefste Grund für den Aufstieg wie auch für die Gefährdung Europas liegt vielleicht in dieser immerwährenden Suche nach der verlorenen, der geahnten und gehofften aurea aetas, die stets gleich hinter dem Horizont beginnt.
The most profound reason for Europe's ascent, as well as for its perilous position, lies in this never-ending search for the lost, the anticipated and hoped for "golden age" that always begins just over the horizon.
(Hagen Schulze [born 1943] 1999: 24)
2 Europe cannot and should not be a "superstate"; nor can it be a kind of revival of the European nation state which is threatened by globalisation. Even less can it be a community of post-national deliberators as Jürgen Habermas would have it. Europe should be constructed as an entity of its own which responds to the heterarchical relational logic of fragmentation which characterises post-modernity and globalisation of which it is a part. It cannot be its counterpart. Europe does not need a "constitution", and it does not need a "people" either. It is no semantic accident that the word government derives from the Latin word, gubernare, which means to steer or pilot a ship, and that gubernare derives from the Greek word for rudder, kybernaein. The ship as pictorial and linguistic metaphor for the state dates back to at least the fifth century B.C., when we find explicit reference to the "whole ship of the polis" in Aristophanes' (ca. The word state itself derives from the Latin verb stare which means "to stand," and the noun status, meaning the "manner of standing"; its use in the sense of "polity" seems to have arisen during medieval times, when it was used to describe the fortified standing armies and stationary seats of government and taxation that emerged when the roving royal administrations began to settle. 8 Already, in its semantic formulation, the ship of state implies an almost oxymoronic blend: movement, direction, and control, on the one hand, and stationary coherence and stability on the other. It is a metaphor that lends itself to broad interpretation, reinterpretation and transubstantiation: precisely what we need, if we are to give face to the European Union's seemingly endless identity crisis.
The two images of a European ship of state depicted here-one from a 1950 poster, the other from a 1998 book cover-appear, at first glance, to be almost identical. And yet, they represent two very different perceptions of European integration. We will take a closer look at both images, and at how they represent the full spectrum of state-like and unstate-like qualities that have been assigned to the European ship.
A. ONE SHIP, TWO PORTRAITS OF INTEGRATION

9
The first of our two European ship-of-state images was the winner of a 1950 contest that was sponsored by the U.S.-based Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) as part of its public relations campaign for the Marshall Plan. In the fall of 1950, the ECA conducted an art competition in the thirteen Marshall Plan countries, offering prizes for the best posters to express the theme "Intra-European Cooperation for a Better Standard of Living." A jury comprised of one prominent graphic artist from each of the participating countries chose twenty-five winning posters from over 10,000 entries, with one prize for first through third place, seven tied for fourth place, and fifteen for fifth. Dutch artist Reyn Dirksen's 13 European ship won the first prize, garnering the then-considerable award of $1,500.
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The insight-and foresight-of Dirksen's vision becomes apparent when we consider some of the other winning posters, and the post-war context in which they were created. Most of the other artists had focused on the contest's stated theme of a "better standard of living" for Europe. In many of the winning posters, the Marshall Plan and American aid were portrayed, either explicitly or implicitly, as the key to salvation. In one German entry, for example, Europe is a multi-national cook eagerly stirring the brew in a massive pot. The poster conveys a rather humble hope for sustenance after the hunger and scarcity of the post-war years, and might even be construed as a plea for a European common market-but the pot is, tellingly, inscribed with the acronym of the American aid program (ERP, for European Recovery Program, the Marshall Plan's official name; see illustration).
15 Similarly, a British contribution bears the slo- LIVING (1950) , it is noted that "Full color reproductions of the twenty-five prize posters have been distributed gan "You hold the key" and shows a giant key inscribed with sheaves of wheat, its blade lined with European flags, and "ERP" in large red letters in the middle of the key ring. In a Swedish poster, a pair of red, white and blue pruning shears labeled "Marshall Aid" lie across a strand of barbed wire; in an Austrian contribution, a broken off tree with an American flag near its roots sprouts new growth and doves build a nest of European flags; another Dutch artist portrayed a windmill with many blades comprised of European flags, and the American flag as rudder; and in a poster by a Turkish artist, an ethereal celestial body comprised of American stars and stripes beams a shaft of light down on a dead tree stump, and a sheaf of wheat sprouts out the side (see illustrations).
Image 3 to 5: Marshal Plan Posters, 1950: Fourth and Fifth Prize Winners
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While they are all attractive and evocative, few of the posters engage the more complex notions of peacekeeping and nation-building that were on the minds of European and American politicians in the aftermath of the war. The deadly manifestations of nationalism had just ravaged the entire continent: the problem that was center stage was how to simultaneously rebuild and stabilize the region. The metaphor of the ship of state, as employed by Dirksen, offered a new, utopian, and yet utterly familiar, solution: a European structure that resembled traditional formulations of statehood, but was comprised of individual member nations, which, together, would guide and propel Europe on a single course.
Dirksen's imagined Europe is a sturdy vessel at full mast. The wind fills its fifteen sails, and it moves confidently through the waves, emerging from the dark mists of a stormy past. It was an idealistic, postwar vision of a European integration that had yet to be construed, the epitome of supranational cooperation. Allusion to the United States is notably absent in Dirksen's poster. The sails comprise most, but not all, of the flags of the Marshall Plan participants. (Switzerland and Sweden are missing.)
17 From our conthroughout Western Europe, and it is anticipated that 10,000,000 Europeans will see these graphic expressions of European recovery and aspirations under the Marshall Plan." Records of the Economic Cooperation Administration are available at http://www.archives.gov/publications/record/1998/09/marshall-plan.html?template =print 16 temporary vantage point, we might be surprised to see the flags of Iceland, Norway, and Turkey, as none of the three have yet acceded to the European Union. Iceland is only considering full EU membership now that it is in dire straits, on the verge of receivership. Norway joined the European Economic Area on January 1, 1994, but its early bids to become a member of the EU were vetoed by France, and membership applications in 1972 and 1994 were defeated in referenda by its own electorate. Press, 1998) , it was a far cry from a unified federal state. As chance would have it, the EU had precisely fifteen member states in 1998: the illustration on the book cover is almost identical to Dirksen's original, except that Turkey, Iceland and Norway have been replaced by Spain, Sweden and Finland. But for Moravcsik, now at Princeton University, it is not a sturdy European ship of state, but rather a collection of varied and colorful flags. And indeed, on closer examination, we notice that Dirksen's ship lacked both a superstructure and a hull-that they were only implied by the billowing sails and the name "EUROPE," and by the little winged figurehead that has been removed in Moravcsik's rendition. (2007) . 20 There is some confusion about use of the terms federation and federal state. The latter is an ambiguous English construction, as it may refer either to an individual member state in a federal system or to the system as a whole. In this essay, we employ "federal state" only in the latter sense. In some contexts federation and federal state are used interchangeably, but in discussions about the EU, the two terms are often distinguished, with federation referring to a less centralized, less nation-state emulating version of federalism than federal state. In this essay, we will avoid use of the word federation so as to minimize the confusion. 21 When asked about his choice of the image Moravcsik says: "I chose it because I liked the design aesthetically, because since I was a kid I've loved flags, and because, as you note, it described a project propelled forward by the dynamic power of the member states-which remain the legitimate authors of the project-hence they are the elements in the picture that are colored, bright, and on which you focus your attention. The fact it came from the Marshall Plan is happenstance-a distraction. I don't deal with that period-nor do I particularly subscribe to the qualities. It is the member states who are in full control. Looked at in this manner, the EU is more like a commonwealth of nations or simple confederation than a true state-a vehicle for international cooperation similar to NAFTA, or ASEAN, though, perhaps, a bit more ambitious.
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Between the idealized ship-of-state view of Dirksen's illustration and Andrew Moravcsik's confederate-style one, lurks a kaleidoscope of variously contorted and colored views of European integration-all of them conceivable interpretations of Dirksen's ship.
B. ONE SHIP … OR A DRUNKEN ARMADA? A BIT OF HISTORY
Even if we focus only on the sails and dismiss the hull as inconsequential, as Moravcsik does, Dirksen's image of Europe presumes the existence of a European Gestalt: it is a single ship making its way, floundering or sinking, as the case may be, in a tempestuous sea. In this sense, the image serves as a sort of meta-narrative for contemporary views of European integration. But despite the idealistic talk of supranational cooperation in the postwar years, a European Gestalt was markedly lacking in the actual implementation of European integration during the fifties and sixties. Not one, but three separate European Communities were created, each with a different legal regime: the ECSC, the EEC, and the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC, Euratom), which latter went into effect at the same time as the EEC in 1958. These effectively divided Europe into three special purpose administrative associations, 23 much like those theory that the US is responsible for the EU, though there may be some small truth in it." (personal communication) Dirksen's poster is, in fact, often used as a symbol of American post-war aid, but it contains no reference to the Marshall plan or the U.S. 24 In this extra-national environment, however, such a legal structure provided none of the consistency or coherence that legal experts were familiar with at the nation state level and made "integration through law" as perceived by some legal scholars difficult if not impossible to achieve.
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The concept of an institutional and political Gestalt did not return to the political limelight until the mid-eighties, when EC-President Jacques Delors began lobbying for a single market. If we view the ship from the bottom up, then we must focus on its body and hull, implied or constructed, as it were, of the word "EUROPE" and decorated with a simple winged figurehead. This is what holds the ship together and provides stability, buoyancy and maneuverability. This first view shows us a ship of state in every sense of the ancient Greek metaphor, and as we gaze upwards at the fifteen flags (which would now be twenty-seven), we cannot describe it without uttering the word that Margaret Thatcher turned into a curse word in her PRESENT (2003) . The metaphor was not used as an explicit expression of federalism that might call to question the structure of the union, as in Dirksen's image, but rather as a general call to unity during the revolution and founding of the federation and in the face of civil war. The ship of state was later used to symbolize unity versus division between the branches of the central government level itself. One wonders if the Dutch ever used the ship of state as rallying cry in their long trajectory from the confederation of The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands (1581-1795) to the unitary Batavian Republic and Napoleon's contraptions (1795-1815), and finally the United Kingdom of the Netherlands (1815 ff. European bill of rights or other charter for individual constitutional rights in the EU treaties, national constitutional law will take precedence over European law.
In our third view of Dirksen's ship, we see both body and sails in equal measure, but their influence shifts with the wind and with our own position relative to the ship. If we watch from leeward as the ship heels onto its side in a gale, only the sails are visible and we focus our attention, as Andrew Moravcsik does, on the high politics of treaty-making. For the moment, the EU will seem to function as a confederacy, with all the Treaty Masters at the table. But if the winds suddenly reverse and the ship heels away from us, then we find ourselves face to hull, and our attention shifts to the low politics of administration and adjudication: we focus on the activities of the administration in Brussels, the workings of its committees, and the decisions of the European Court of Justice in Strasbourg. Now the EU appears to function like a federal state. As the winds subside and the ship rights itself, we see that it is, indeed, a hybrid of forms, wherein low and high politics mingle. Now we must consider a whole shifting, multi-tiered system. Here national prerogatives cannot be entirely defensive or obstructive, like the German Solange decisions, but must be constructive, geared toward building and participating in a close-knit, mutually beneficial union.
Is this a conceivable end state for the EU, a sort of hybrid construction that combines the best of both worlds, confederate and federate? Or is it really just a transitory stage, a "federal state in the making" as the first Commission President, Walter Hallstein, called it?
37 After all, both the United States and Germany wavered and floundered in similar fashion before settling into their modern federal forms. 38 But it may be that we need to set aside our conceptions of confederate and federate in our interpretation of the modern EU-it may be that the end state in this dynamic whole-ship view is not a hybrid of the two, not between federal and confederal, but outside of them. The federal versus confederal dichotomy took form during the latter half of the nineteenth and early twentieth century and was intimately tied to the evolution of the nation state. But Europe's problem, in the past sixty years, has been to deal with political trajectories that extend beyond the nation state. 39 It may well be that what we need for the EU is a sui generis construction.
There has been some talk in recent years of a European institutional and constitutional Sonderweg 40 and of Europe as a "polycentric polity." 41 But most sui generis approaches to date have concerned themselves with dismissing the old categories, while failing to really look beyond them, to discover and describe new genera. 42 One of the few attempts to actually define the new form looks beyond nation state and EU institutions to the peoples of Europe: unity exists to the extent that a European identity coexists with national identity. 43 In Germany, Ingolf Pernice is the main champion of this post-national version of the EU, referring to it as a Verfassungsverbund in German-literally, a constitutional union or network of constitutions-and as "multilevel constitutionalism" in English. 44 Unlike the Staatenverbund, the Verfassungsverbund does not preclude a federal end state-but neither does it focus on achieving a federal state institutional apparatus. Some scholars, nevertheless, doubt that this concept is truly sui generis and see it as the leftovers of a failed federal state vision imbued with post-modern individualism.
Another arguably sui generis version of the EU defines its end state as the current state. "What you see is what you get," might be the motto here. Sovereignty does not reside at the center, or with the nations, or at some difficult-to-determine and ever-shifting point in between, as for the Staatenverbund. Sovereignty is, rather, in a permanently suspended state, a Schwebezustand that is neither here nor there. approach, what we will refer to here as the "Union," based on the historic names.
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If we are to adopt a sui generis view of the EU that looks beyond the nation state, we may, finally, need to relinquish our ship metaphor. French artist Fabien Vienne's contribution to the Marshall Contest, for example, may come close to imagining such a Europe. Like Dirksen's ship, it looked beyond the postwar deprivation and American aid, but now salvation lies not in a common state, but in cooperation and human solidarity: here we see a sturdy construct of human hands with the national flags suspended in the air between them.
Image 6: Marshall Plan Contest, Fall 1950
49 tence of the federation must not subsume the individual existence of the member states, nor can the existence of the member states subsume that of the federation. The member states are not simply subordinated, subjects of the federation, nor is the federation subordinated and subject to them. The federation exists only in this existential connection and in this balance. From both directions, various levels of association are possible, the most extreme case of which always leads to the fact that either the federation dissolves itself and only individual states still exist or the individual states cease to exist, and there remains only a single state. The essence of the federation resides in a dualism of political existence, in a connection between federalist togetherness and political unity, on the one hand, and the persistence of a majority, a pluralism of political unities, on the other. Such an intermediary condition [Schwebezustand] necessarily leads to many conflicts, which must be decided." (Our emphasis) 46 48 Bund is often translated as "federation" which creates some ambiguity, as federation is often used interchangeably with federal state. Here we will use the term "union" for this newly defined form of EU governance. See also footnote 20. 49 By Fabien Vienne (born 1925; see http://www.fabienvienne.com/en_ biography.Html); GCMF Catalog ID 1005.
Our fourth view of the European ship is not so optimistic. Here we again get a glimpse of the whole ship, but now it appears as a frightful chimera, construed of incompatible body parts, a monstrous creation built of incompatible body parts and doomed to self-destruct. The nation state flags have been forced to mast above a supranational hull, except there are no masts, nor, for that matter, a helmsman or crew, and the hull is comprised of a weak assembly of alphabetic characters, a mere word. It is a ship that is constitutionally unfit to sail, forced into existence by post-World-War II emergencies and a looming cold war. This chimeric contraption's only recognized talent was its ability to scare the Soviet Block, and with the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the transformation of Eastern Europe that followed, it lost its only conceivable raison d'être. Its transition state was anti-communism and its end state is self-destruction and annihilation. In political parlance it is a form of nationalism, a view most often professed by the political right.
These four views have not emerged ready-made from the legal discourse. They have, rather, evolved over the course of EU history, produced by different legal traditions to meet the needs of the moment. Nor, of course, are they mutually exclusive in that different aspects of the EU may be best addressed by one or the other view.
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D. A LONG AND WINDING ROAD … TO WHERE?
A federal vision for Europe accompanied the birth of the European communities and provided the moral economy for founding and building Europe's institutions. This was the maxim of hope that informed Reyn Dirksen's illustration in 1950, transcending the ruins of the Second World War and propelling Europe away from the nationalism that had descended on it after the first one, toward a new, yet-to-bedefined supranationalism. Even the United States, which had retreated into its splendid isolation after World War I, now supported the European efforts to rebuild and unify. 
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When European integration intensified in the 1980s, a new generation of general public law scholars challenged the federalist creed of the now-entrenched European law specialists, and our second, confederal or Treaty Master vision of the European ship took shape. The Staatenverbund variation on the theme was a conservative attempt to compromise the federal and confederal visions in the 1990s, and attempts to bypass the impasse altogether gave rise to the third vision, the hybrid and sui generis interpretations.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, while the continental-and particularly the German-lawyers were squabbling about the locus of sovereignty and whether the last word would lie with the national or Euro- 50 The European integration process is so huge and incomprehensible that Donald Puchala used the old story of the blind men and the elephant to describe the arguments about its nature-and that was back in 1972, before it really grew out of hand and the arguments heated up. pean courts, political scientists argued that the lawyers were missing the point. 53 Integration was not a zero-sum proposition. It was about power-sharing, a potentially win-win proposition, if one thought in terms of multi-level governance and retired the outmoded nation-state vocabulary of federal versus confederal from use. Whereas the lawyers attempted to shape European integration via the national Constitutional and European courts, political scientists' interpretations were mostly observational, based on empirical analyses of political processes and institutions and less hampered by preconceived normative legal categories. But like the lawyers, the political scientists differed in their methodologies and perceptions, and their interpretations varied accordingly. 54 Some concentrated on how things had changed over time, a sort of movie approach known as historical institutionalism; others looked at results, a sort of snapshot approach known as intergovernmentalism. And still others, like Andrew Moravcsik with his liberal intergovernmentalism, did something in between, neither movie nor snapshot, but a sort of slideshow. 55 Like the lawyers, these approaches emerged from different sub-disciplines-historical institutionalism from comparative politics and from European scholars of EU integration, and intergovernmentalism from the arguably higher art of international relations. 56 In the 1990s, the intergovernmentalists saw that member states were in full control and were only using the EU as a forum for inter-state bargaining, with international actors serving as facilitators for the nations' diplomatic maneuvers. In the 1990s, the EU lost its hopeful course. George Ross recognized this as early as 1992 when he wrote that: "The heroic period of the European Community renaissance that began in 1985 is over." 60 The EU was threatening to devolve from a political union to a free trade zone, like the European Free Trade Association 61 that the U.K. created as an alternative to integration in 1960. Not just stalled in the doldrums or temporarily lost in the fog, it seemed, for the first time, to lack a charted course. There is talk of L'Europe à plusieurs vitesses, where the nations make no attempt to go forward in solidarity but move at their own speeds, and worse, of a multi-speed and multi-track Europe, where they all chart separate courses. It is here that the pessimistic fourth vision raises its ugly head and we get a glimpse of the chimeric ship tearing itself apart, en route to self-destruction. Though no one, as yet, has seriously threatened to withdraw, the endless enlargements are now tempered by the possibility of member state withdrawalan option that was hitherto unthinkable and perhaps even illegal under the old treaties 62 -and member state posturing and blackmail seem to be turning into the standard modus operandi. Karl-Heinz Ladeur might argue that the meta-narrative of a European Gestalt is simply a myth that has no place in post-modern realism. Frightening chimeras are as much the stuff of superstition and nostalgia as a European federal state is, as, indeed, the mid-twentieth century nation state is. The postmodern Europe that Ladeur describes is flat: its nations are part of a transnational network of governance and the EU can, at best, hope to serve the role of "mediator," in the free-for-all of private and public actors.
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To those of us who cling to the ancient wisdom of our myths, however, the financial and economic crises currently eating their way through our globalized system are calling out for a strong EU and reminding us of the need for transatlantic cooperation. Neither is easy to come by. The past decade has seen the EU floundering and transatlantic cooperation withering, though a couple of small support enterprises have held their own: The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF), founded with German funding in the 1970s as a memorial to post-war Marshall Plan aid, and Harvard's Center for European Studies (CES) which has been a meeting place for scholars of comparative European politics and integration from both sides of the Atlantic since 1968. The whole series of Marshall Plan posters hangs on the walls of the George C Marshall Foundation in Lexington, Virginia, and many decorate the GMF headquarters in Washington, D.C. And at the CES office in Cambridge, Dirksen's ship hangs to the left of the elevator in 57 Two essays characterize the debate well: Pierson 1996 (supra, note 56) and Moravcsik 2005 (supra, note 56). The
